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ABSTRACT This article discusses how self-regulatory models can be
used to understand people’s response to health threats. The article begins
with a general discussion of the principles and assumptions of self-reg-
ulatory models of behavior. Two distinct lines of research are then pre-
sented addressing two important processes of adaptive self-regulation.
First, we provide a brief overview of the literature on optimism and ad-
justment to chronic disease and other health outcomes. Second, we
present an overview of the process of disengagement from unattainable
goals, focusing on recent research. We close by making recommendations
for future research.
The purpose of this article is to discuss some of the ways in which
self-regulatory models of behavior can help us understand people’s
responses to health threats. This article begins with a general dis-
cussion of a set of orienting assumptions and principles embedded in
models of self-regulation of behavior, placing the heaviest emphasis
on our own approach. We then describe two distinct lines of research
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ing one aspect of effective self-regulation, focusing there on the
relationship between dispositional optimism and adjustment to
chronic disease and responses to health threats. Since the persistent
pursuit of personal goals is only one part of adaptive self-regulation,
we then consider the equally important process of disengaging from
important goals by focusing on the recent literature on these issues.
BEHAVIORAL SELF-REGULATION
What do we mean by the term behavioral self-regulation? When we
use this term, we are referring to processes by which behavior hap-
pens. We believe that human behavior is a continual process of
moving toward and away from different kinds of mentally repre-
sented goals. The idea that human behavior is organized around
goals is common among personality theorists (Austin & Vancouver,
1996; Bandura, 1997; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Elliot & Dweck, 1988;
Emmons, 1986; Higgins, 1987). While goals are conceptualized dif-
ferently among theorists, there are also many similarities. All share
the view that goals energize and direct activities (Pervin, 1982), con-
veying the sense that goals give meaning to people’s lives and that
understanding the person means understanding the person’s goals
(Baumeister, 1989; Scheier & Carver, 2001). Goal-related theories
often presume that the self consists partly of the person’s goals and
values and the organization among them.
Goals and Feedback Processes
Certainly, people’s goals would not be meaningful or interesting if
they were not somehow related to their actions. How are goals and
action linked? In our view, goals serve as reference values for feed-
back processes. A feedback loop consists of four elements—an input
function, a reference value, a comparator, and an output function—
in a particular organization (see Figure 1; cf. Miller, Galanter, &
Pribram, 1960).
An input sensor can be thought of as embodying perception: it
brings in information about what exists. The reference value pro-
vides information about what is desired or intended (i.e., a goal). The
comparator functions to compare the input and reference value,
producing one of two outcomes: either the values being compared
1722 Rasmussen, Wrosch, Scheier, et al.are discriminably different from one another or they are not. For the
present purposes, the output function is behavior, though, some-
times, the behavior is a mental or physiological response.
There are two types of feedback loops, corresponding to two types
of goals, and the nature of the output varies with the type of loop. In
a discrepancy-reducing or negative-feedback loop, output intends to
diminish discrepancies detected between the input and reference val-
ue. If no difference is found, the output doesn’t change. If the com-
parison yields a discrepancy, the output changes so as to diminish
the discrepancy. This matching of input to reference value or dis-
crepancy reduction is reﬂected in attempts to approach desired goals.
In a discrepancy-enlarging or positive-feedback loop, the output
increases differences between input and reference value. The refer-
ence value is one to avoid rather than approach (for distinctions be-
tween approach and avoidance goals, see Coats, Janoff-Bulman, &
Alpert, 1996; Elliot & Sheldon, 1997). One could conceptualize such
values as ‘‘anti-goals.’’ The attempt is to move away from the ref-
erence value, but movement away in one direction is as good as
movement in another. In living systems, discrepancy-enlarging loops
are usually constrained by discrepancy-reducing loops (Carver,
Lawrence, Scheier, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1998). Stated different-
ly, attempting to avoid something often results in approaching
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Figure1
Schematic depiction of a feedback loop. In such a loop a sensed
value is compared to a reference value or standard, and adjustments
are made in an output function as necessary.
Self-Regulation and Health 1723something else. In this article we focus primarily on approach loops,
but it should be acknowledged that some of the situations we de-
scribe also have aspects that can be viewed in terms of avoidance.
Hierarchical Organization of Goals
Goals vary in several ways. One way, just mentioned, is between
approach and avoidance. Goals also differ in level of abstraction.
For instance, a person may have the goal of being healthy, which is
at a high level of abstraction. At a lower level of abstraction, the
same person might have the goal to exercise every day. The ﬁrst goal
mentioned is to be a particular kind of person, whereas the second
goal refers to accomplishing a certain kind of action. Goals can be
even more concrete, such as the goal of completing an hour of jog-
ging. Such goals are closer to speciﬁcations of individual acts than
the second goal mentioned, which was more of a summary statement
about the desired outcome of intended action patterns.
The examples previously mentioned are useful in illustrating how
goals are ordered in a hierarchy, such that very abstract goals
subsume goals that are more concrete. Powers (1973) argued that
behavior occurs via a hierarchical organization of discrepancy-
reducing feedback loops. Since such loops imply goals, his argu-
ment assumed a hierarchical model of goals. He reasoned that the
output of a high-level system consists of resetting reference values at
the next lower level. In other words, higher-order systems ‘‘behave’’
by providing goals to the systems just below them. Thus, goals are
more concrete at each lower level, and control at each level regulates
a quality that contributes to that controlled at the next higher level.
In this way, there is a ‘‘cascade’’ of higher-order abstract loops to
lower-order concrete loops, as the elements of the higher-order goals
are manifested in more and more specific pieces of action.
A simpliﬁed depiction of this hierarchy is shown in Figure 2. Lines
are used to indicate only the links among the goals; the diagram
omits the loops of feedback processes. The lines indicate that moving
toward a particular lower goal contributes to the attainment of a
higher one (or even several higher goals at once). Multiple lines to a
given higher-order goal imply that several lower actions can con-
tribute to its attainment. Again, there are goals to ‘‘be’’ a certain way
and goals to ‘‘do’’ certain things (and at lower levels, goals to create
physical movement).
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ceptualizing behavior (see Carver & Scheier, 1998, 1999). Goals at any
given level can often be attained by several means at lower levels. In
other words, there are many different pathways to achieve the same
goal. For example, you can be productive (an abstract goal) by writing
a manuscript, by cleaning your house, or by thinking through solu-
tions to a complex problem. This allows the hierarchical approach to
address the fact that people sometimes shift the way in which they are
trying to reach a goal when the goal itself hasn’t changed. The quality
of the higher-order goal is implied by each of the lower-order activities.
Goals also vary in importance. The higher a goal is in the organ-
ization, the more it is tied to the sense of self. Thus, goals at higher
levels tend to be more important than those at lower levels.
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System concepts
Principles
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goals
Motor 
control 
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Ideal 
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Be 
healthy
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Figure2
A hierarchy of goals (or of feedback loops). Terms on the left side of
ﬁgure provide the labels that Powers (1973) used to identify the top
levels of control in the specific hierarchy that he proposed. Lines in-
dicate the contribution of lower level goals to specific higher-level
goals. They can also be read in the opposite direction, indicating that
a given higher-order goal speciﬁes more concrete goals at the next
lower level. The hierarchy depicted involves goals of ‘‘being’’ partic-
ular ways, which are attained by ‘‘doing’’ particular actions. (Adapt-
ed from Carver & Scheier, 1998).
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tance. Rather, a lower goal that is central to attaining a valued ab-
stract goal is more important than a goal that is less central to
attaining the abstract goal. Further, one that contributes to attaining
several higher-level goals at once thereby acquires greater impor-
tance (see also Carver & Scheier, 1999).
Affect
The model described to this point addresses goals and actions, but
another important aspect to consider is emotional experience. We
posit that the principle of feedback control also applies to feelings.
That is, we believe that feelings arise via a second feedback process
(for details, see Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998, 1999). In brief, the
argument is that this second feedback system is checking on how well
the behavior system is doing at carrying out its job. Positive feelings
mean you are doing better at something than you need to. Negative
feelings mean you are doing worse than you need to. As in any
feedback system, the input is compared against a reference value (cf.
Frijda, 1986, 1988). The outcome of this comparison process is
manifest in two ways: a hazy sense of expectancy, or conﬁdence ver-
sus doubt, and affect—a sense of positivity or negativity.
Conﬁdence and Doubt
As just mentioned, we think the experience of affect results from the
same mechanism that also yields a hazy sense of conﬁdence and
doubt. We suggest that affect and expectancies are intertwined as
behavior unfolds. As affect becomes more negative, doubts increase;
as affect becomes more positive, favorable expectations and conﬁ-
dence also rise.
However, this contextual sense of conﬁdence and doubt does not
occur in a vacuum. When one’s efforts at goal attainment are dis-
rupted by adversity, distress emotions and doubt can result. At
times, however, these immediate reactions are blended with or over-
ridden by other information. When people experience adversity in
trying to move toward goals, they periodically interrupt their effort
and assess in a more deliberative way their likelihood of success (see
Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990, 1998). In other words, people suspend
the behavioral stream, step outside it, and judge what is likely to
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prior outcomes in similar situations and thoughts about other ap-
proaches to the problem and about other resources they might utilize
(cf. Lazarus, 1966; MacNair & Elliot, 1992). They also may use at-
tributions of prior events and social comparison information (e.g.,
Wills, 1981; Wood, 1989; Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985).
How are these thoughts linked to expectancies? Sometimes people
retrieve chronic expectancies from memory. In this case, these sum-
maries of products of previous behavior already are expectancies.
For instance, a person who has had difﬁculties losing weight over
multiple past attempts may ﬁnd himself automatically expecting the
worst from an upcoming weight loss program.
At other times, people think about possible changes to the situ-
ation. The person must evaluate the consequences for such possibil-
ities to inﬂuence expectancies. Such an evaluation can be performed
by playing behavioral scenarios through mentally (cf. Taylor &
Pham, 1996). For example, a patient with cancer who is considering
a new therapy may play through a scenario of undergoing the treat-
ment, having limited side effects, and achieving an improvement in
health. Playing through that scenario may help the patient derive a
sense of conﬁdence. Effective mental scenarios emphasize explicit
processes needed to reach a goal, including the concrete steps that
must be followed in order to get there (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, &
Armor, 1998; see also Cameron & Nicholls, 1998).
Efforts and Giving Up
Expectancies, no matter how they arise, have an important inﬂuence
on behavior. If expectations are of success, the person renews effort.
If expectations are of failure, the tendency is to disengage from effort
and, potentially, from the goal itself. Thus, there is a great divide
between these two classes of action. One set of responses involves
continued efforts at moving forward, whereas the other set consists
of disengagement and quitting (see also Klinger, 1975; Wortman &
Brehm, 1975).
The notion that goals can vary in speciﬁcity also applies to expect-
ancies (Armor & Taylor, 1998; Carver & Scheier, 1998). That is,
expectancies also can range from the very general, to those about a
particular domain of life, to the very concrete and specific. For
example, a cardiac patient can be conﬁdent or doubtful about
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other medical procedure, or about being able to climb a ﬂight of stairs.
Which expectancies matter in what circumstances? Although the
answer isn’t entirely clear, we would venture to say that probably all
of them matter. Expectancy-based theories often hold that behavior
is best predicted when the speciﬁcity of the expectancy matches that
of the behavior. Other times it is argued that prediction should take
into account several levels of speciﬁcity. It also has been suggested
that in novel and in multidetermined situations the person’s gener-
alized expectations are useful in predicting behavior and emotions
(Scheier & Carver, 1985).
Generalized expectancies are those that pertain to very diverse
outcomes. They pertain to both abstract and concrete goals. Hence,
people who are generally optimistic believe that they will attain not
just one higher-order goal but all of their higher-order goals, along
with the subgoals that need to be attained to satisfy those higher-
order goals.
OPTIMISM, PESSIMISM, AND REACTIONS TO HEALTH THREATS
The self-regulation model just reviewed has implications for under-
standing how people deal with threats to their health as well as ex-
perience positive health events such as the delivery of a healthy baby.
Much of the research based on this model has focused on how var-
iations in expectations inﬂuence adjustment when people confront
health threats. The rationale behind this research runs as follows:
Confronting adversity can create an eagerness to overcome the dif-
ﬁculties, or it can create doubts and giving up. Whether the person is
optimistic or pessimistic affects what emotions follow. People who
are optimistic should have a set of relatively positive feelings—even
when things are difﬁcult. People who are pessimistic should experi-
ence more negative feelings (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Scheier &
Carver, 1992).
Although many individual difference variables might be invoked
as determinants of the differences just described, the following re-
view focuses on expectancies operationalized in terms of dispositio-
nal optimism, as described by Scheier & Carver (1985; see also
Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). According to this perspective,
persons high in optimism tend generally to expect positive outcomes
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pessimistic tend generally to expect outcomes that are more negative.
We should explicitly acknowledge that the review that we offer is
not comprehensive, but it does provide a sense of the nature of the
associations that have emerged involving optimism in the health do-
main. Our review includes, primarily, studies that measure psycho-
logical outcomes but a few that measure physical outcomes as well.
All of the studies are prospective in nature.
Coronary Disease
Researchers have examined the effects of optimism on adjustment to
the stress of heart disease and its treatment. One such study examined
the effects of optimism on recovery in men undergoing and recover-
ing from coronary artery bypass surgery (Scheier et al., 1989). Pa-
tients provided information at 3 points in time: (1) the day before
surgery, (2) 6–8 days after the surgery, and (3) 6 months postsurgery.
Questionnaires assessed their mood, reactions to surgery, coping
strategies, and quality of life. The researchers statistically controlled
for medical factors, including extensiveness of patient’s surgery, se-
verity of the patient’s underlying CAD, and patient’s standing on the
major risk factors for coronary heart disease. Before surgery, those
scoring higher on optimism reported lower levels of hostility and de-
pression than pessimists. One week after surgery, optimists reported
more happiness, relief, and greater satisfaction with their medical
care compared to pessimists. Optimists also reported greater satis-
faction with support received from friends. At 6 months, optimists
were significantly more likely to have returned to vigorous physical
activity and more likely to have a higher quality of life than pessi-
mists. In a 5-year follow-up of these patients, optimists reported
greater quality of life and subjective well-being (described in Scheier
& Carver, 1992).
Fitzgerald and colleagues (1993) conducted another study on
quality of life and optimism after coronary bypass surgery. They
collected information from 49 patients 1 month before and 8 months
after surgery; they also controlled for disease severity. Optimists
were less likely to report presurgical distress and were more likely to
report postsurgical satisfaction with life. Additionally, optimism was
associated with perceived control over the course of the illness. Op-
timism was not significantly related to health locus of control before
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timism seems to have been funneled into a greater conﬁdence about
the outcome of the surgery and thus into satisfaction with life in
general.
In a study of women undergoing coronary artery bypass surgery,
King and colleagues (1998) also found optimism to be beneﬁcial.
They collected data at 1 week, and 1, 6, and 12 months postsurgery.
Their ﬁndings suggest that optimism is associated with positive
moods and life satisfaction and is inversely related to negative
moods. Also, optimism assessed at Week 1 was related to more pos-
itive and less negative moods at 1 month. Finally, optimistic persons
were more likely to accept their situation and were less likely to use
escapism.
Similar beneﬁcial effects of optimism have been observed in an-
other study focused on patients recovering from coronary artery
bypass surgery (Mahler & Kulik, 2000). In this study, optimism was
assessed two to three days following surgery. Additional psychoso-
cial measures were administered at the same point in time, and again
at 1, 3, 6, and 12 months after hospital discharge. Optimism was
significantly associated with less pain during the earliest assessed
recovery periods.
A ﬁnal study (Matthews, Raikkonen, Sutton-Tyrell, & Kuller,
2004) explored the effects of optimism on progression of carotid at-
herosclerosis. Healthy middle-aged women. who were enrolled in a
larger ongoing study of cardiovascular risk factors, underwent two
carotid ultrasound scans to measure intima media thickness (IMT),
considered to be an early indicator of atherosclerosis, at 10 and 13
years after study enrollment. Over the 3-year period between scans,
optimists were less likely than pessimists to have an increase in ca-
rotid IMT, even when statistically controlling for possible biological,
lifestyle, and medication covariates. Indeed, those who were opti-
mistic exhibited virtually no increase in IMT over the time period.
Cancer
Researchers also have studied optimism in the context of adjusting
to the diagnosis and treatment of cancer. One early study explored
adjustment to treatment for early-stage breast cancer (Carver et al.,
1993). Patients were interviewed at the time of diagnosis, the day
before surgery, 10 days after surgery, and at 3-, 6-, and 12-month
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distress over time, above and beyond the effect of medical variables
and the effects of earlier distress. In other words, the prediction of
distress at 3, 6, and 12 months after surgery was significant even after
controlling for distress level at the prior assessment point. Thus,
optimism predicted lower initial distress as well as resilience to dis-
tress during the year following surgery. Indeed, a follow-up study of
these women (together with other women participating in other
studies by the same research group) found that greater optimism
predicted lower distress even at 5–13 years after treatment (Carver
et al., 2005).
Another study examined emotional adjustment of breast cancer
survivors (Trunzo & Pinto, 2003). Patients who had completed
treatment within 1 year prior to the study were eligible to partici-
pate. Optimism and mood were assessed at baseline and 6- and
12-month follow-ups. At each measurement point, optimism was a
negative predictor of mood disturbance, suggesting that optimists
were less vulnerable to emotional distress.
Similar beneﬁcial effects of optimism were demonstrated among
a group of men receiving radiation therapy for prostate cancer
( Johnson, 1996). Optimism was assessed prior to the ﬁrst radiation
treatment, and mood was assessed throughout the treatment period
and at 2 weeks and 1 and 3 months following the end of treatment.
Optimism was a strong predictor of patients’ emotional responses
both during and after treatment, with less optimistic patients being
more likely to experience negative moods.
Other Health Contexts
Although the majority of research relating optimism to well-being
has focused on heart disease and cancer, there also is research fo-
cusing on other health domains. The ﬁndings are consistent with
those just reviewed. For instance, Taylor and colleagues (1992)
studied optimism and adjustment among a sample of men at risk
for developing Acquired Immunodeﬁciency Syndrome (AIDS).
Greater optimism was associated with lower levels of subsequent
distress.
Research linking optimism to positive health outcomes has not
only focused on health threats. Other studies have examined the in-
ﬂuence of optimism on adjustment in the context of reproductive
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depression before and after childbirth (Carver & Gaines, 1987; Font-
aine & Jones, 1997). In both studies, optimism predicted lower levels
of depressed affect both during pregnancy and postpartum.
Similar points were made in a study that examined psychological
adjustment of women during pregnancy (Park, Moore, Turner, &
Adler, 1997). Women at their ﬁrst prenatal visit were invited to par-
ticipate. Optimism was assessed at this time, when the women were
approximately 2 months pregnant. Several other measures were ob-
tained during the 3rd trimester of pregnancy. Optimism during the
initial months of pregnancy predicted less perceived stress, anxiety,
and substance use during the 3rd trimester of pregnancy.
Another project studied prenatal psychosocial predictors of infant
birth weight (Rini, Dunkel-Schetter, Wadhwa, & Sandman, 1999).
In this study, women completed psychosocial measures during the
3rd trimester of their pregnancy; birth outcomes, such as gestational
age at delivery and birth weight, were collected from medical charts
after delivery. Women higher in optimism, mastery, and self-esteem
gave birth to larger babies. These variables were significant predic-
tors of birth weight even after controlling for psychosocial stress,
length of gestation, marital status, maternal age, income, education,
and ethnicity.
OPTIMISM, PESSIMISM, AND COPING
It is apparent that optimism is beneﬁcial when people experience a
threat to their health. That is, optimists experience better outcomes,
such as less distress, compared to pessimists. Why do these differ-
ences exist? An idea from folklore and the popular media is that
optimists are simply more cheerful than pessimists. This explanation
is less plausible, though, when considering studies in which differ-
ences in distress emerged even when previous distress was statisti-
cally controlled. Another possibility that has gained substantial
empirical support is that optimists and pessimists cope differently
with adversity.
Space limitations prevent a thorough overview of the coping lit-
erature. However, we think it is important to provide brief consid-
eration of how optimists and pessimists differ in the strategies they
use to cope with health threats and to link those differences to the
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portant theme explored earlier: expectations play a pivotal role in
behavioral responses to adversity. People who are conﬁdent about
the future exert continuing effort, even when dealing with serious
adversity. In contrast, people who are doubtful about the future tend
to withdraw effort. They are more likely to pull away or try to escape
the adversity by wishful thinking, and they are more likely to seek
temporary distractions that don’t help to solve the problem. Some-
times they even give up completely.
These differences in coping have been examined in a number of
studies on optimism and distress, exploring whether differences in
coping mediate differences in well-being. Many of the studies were
conducted with cancer patients. For example, Stanton and Snider
(1993) followed a group of women undergoing breast biopsy. Meas-
ures of optimism, mood, and coping were obtained the day before
biopsy in all participants. Women who received a cancer diagnosis
were then reassessed 24 hours before surgery and 3 weeks after sur-
gery. Women with a benign diagnosis also completed a second as-
sessment. Pessimists used more cognitive avoidance in coping with
the upcoming diagnostic procedure than did optimists. This con-
tributed to distress prior to biopsy and also predicted postbiopsy
distress among women with positive diagnoses.
In a study described earlier (Carver et al., 1993), women diag-
nosed with early-stage breast cancer were followed for the 1st year
after treatment. Optimism, coping (with the diagnosis of cancer),
and mood were assessed the day before surgery. Coping and mood
also were assessed 10 days postsurgery, and at three follow-ups dur-
ing the next year. Both before and after surgery, optimism was as-
sociated with a pattern of reported coping strategies that involved
accepting the reality of the situation, placing as positive a light on the
situation as possible, trying to relieve the situation with humor, and
(at presurgery) taking active steps to do whatever there was to be
done. Pessimism was related to denial and behavioral disengagement
(giving up) at each measurement point.
The differences in coping between optimists and pessimists also re-
lated to distress. Positive reframing, acceptance, and the use of humor
were all inversely related to distress at pre- and postsurgery. Denial
and behavioral disengagement were positively related to distress at all
measurement points. At the 6-month follow-up, another kind of
avoidance coping, self-distraction, was related positively to distress.
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indirect through coping, particularly at post-surgery.
Research also has examined the link between coping and distress
among patients undergoing coronary artery bypass surgery. One
study assessed the use of attentional-cognitive strategies as ways of
dealing with the stress produced by the surgery and recovery (Scheier
et al., 1989). Prior to surgery, optimists were more likely than pes-
simists to report they were making plans for their future and setting
goals for their recovery. Optimists also tended to report being less
focused on their physical symptoms and their distress than pessi-
mists. After surgery, optimists were more likely to seek out and re-
quest information about what the physician would be requiring of
them in the months ahead (reﬂecting greater engagement in the re-
covery process). Finally, optimists were less likely to report trying to
suppress thoughts about their physical symptoms. Further analyses
revealed that the positive impact of optimism on quality of life 6
months postsurgery occurred partly through the indirect effect on
differences in coping.
The study of women undergoing coronary artery bypass surgery
described earlier (King et al., 1998) also examined coping. Optimists
displayed more positive thinking during the week following surgery,
engaged in more attempts at ﬁnding meaning at 1 month, and em-
ployed less escapism at 12 months. Finding meaning and escapism
partially explained the relation between optimism and negative
mood.
Finally, in the study concerning maternal adjustment to pregnan-
cy (Park et al., 1997), optimists had higher scores than pessimists on
a measure of constructive thinking. That is, they gave evidence of
thinking about and solving daily problems in an effective way. Op-
timism and constructive thinking also correlated negatively with lat-
er anxiety and positively with later positive states of mind. Further,
the link between optimism and each of these markers of psycholog-
ical adjustment was mediated through the tendency of optimists to
engage in constructive or problem-focused thinking.
The research reviewed here indicates that optimists tend to use
more problem-focused coping strategies than do pessimists, and
when problem-focused coping is not feasible, optimists turn to adap-
tive emotion-focused strategies (i.e., acceptance, humor, positive re-
framing). Pessimists tend to use such strategies as overt denial and
mental and behavioral disengagement from the goals with which the
1734 Rasmussen, Wrosch, Scheier, et al.stressor is interfering. Furthermore, the ﬁndings are consistent with
the idea that these differences in coping are at least partially respon-
sible for differences in emotional well-being, and, possibly, physical
well-being, between optimists and pessimists. The ﬁndings thus im-
plicate elements of self-regulation models in coping with chronic ill-
ness and other threats to physical health.
While the literature generally seems to indicate that active coping
and persistence are good for a person’s emotional well-being and
that the use of denial and avoidance strategies are detrimental, we
wonder if this is always the case. Some goals are simply unattainable.
It seems reasonable that disengaging from such goals may be ben-
eﬁcial in effective self-regulation. Certainly, an important area for
future research is to consider the possibility that giving up might not
always be bad and that persisting might not always be good. In the
next section, we shift our focus and consider more carefully the self-
regulatory processes that are involved in the holding on and letting
go of goals.
GOAL ADJUSTMENT AND QUALITY OF LIFE
Clearly, people sometimes experience difﬁculty with goal attainment.
In many situations, such difﬁculty can be overcome if a person invests
more effort, strengthens the psychological commitment toward,
or ﬁnds an alternative path to realizing the threatened goal (e.g.,
Bandura, 1997; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995). At times, however, it
may not be possible to make further progress towards a desired goal
because the goal itself is unattainable.
Goals may be unattainable for different reasons. For example, a
person may select an unrealistic goal that will never be attained (e.g.,
a 57-year old man becoming a quarterback in the NFL). In addition,
goals that were realistic and attainable at some point in a person’s
life may become unattainable over time. This may be caused by the
occurrence of critical life events or age-related declines in the op-
portunities to attain a goal. For example, an accident, unemploy-
ment, or growing older may render impossible the pursuit of a given
goal—for example, staying in good health, buying a house, or having
your own children. Finally, there are situations in which a person
can no longer pursue a goal because the person needs to focus time
and energy on the pursuit of other more important and resource-
intensive goals. For example, a person may not be able to pursue
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movies, exercising), because he or she has to invest all available time
and energy in the pursuit of certain higher-order goals (e.g., estab-
lishing a career, taking care of a sick child; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver,
& Schulz, 2003).
Independent of the specific reasons for goal constraints, having
an unattainable goal creates problems. A person who cannot make
progress toward a desired goal is likely to experience declines in
subjective well-being (Carver & Scheier, 1990). In addition, the neg-
ative psychological consequences resulting from the experience of
unattainable goals may further inﬂuence a person’s physical health
(Wrosch, Miller, Scheier, & Brun de Pontet, 2005). Research indi-
cates that low levels of subjective well-being can modify biological
processes in the endocrine and immune systems in ways that increase
vulnerability to disease (Heim, Ehlert, & Hellhammer, 2000; Segerst-
rom & Miller, 2004). It can also relate to a variety of self-reported
health problems (e.g., constipation or asthma; Afari, Schmaling,
Barnhart, & Buchwald, 2001; Garvey, Noyes, & Yates, 1990), in-
cluding rendering people more susceptible to the common cold
(Cohen, Doyle, Turner, Alper, & Skoner, 2003). Thus, having un-
attainable goals may compromise not only people’s subjective well-
being but also their physical health.
We have argued that people can avoid the negative psychological
and physical consequences resulting from the experience of unat-
tainable goals if they engage in adaptive self-regulation (Carver &
Scheier, 1990; Wrosch et al., 2003, 2005). More specifically, people
thrive if they can adjust their goals in situations where prior goals
have become unattainable. We suggest that goal adjustment involves
two processes. First, we propose that a person needs to disengage
from the unattainable goal. To disengage successfully, he or she
needs to withdraw effort and commitment from pursuing that goal
(Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003). Goal disengagement should
be adaptive because it removes the person from the negative emo-
tional consequences of repeated goal failure (for beneﬁcial effects of
disengagement, see also Brandtsta ¨ dter & Renner, 1990; Carver &
Scheier, 1990, 1998; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Klinger, 1975;
Nesse, 2000). Second, we suggest that this person needs to reengage
goal-directed efforts elsewhere. To reengage successfully, a person
needs to identify, commit to, and start to pursue alternative goals
(Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, & Carver, 2003). Goal reengagement
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the negative emotions associated with the inability to make progress
towards a desired goal.
In support of this argument, research has shown that abandoning
unattainable goals may help preserve a person’s subjective well-being
(see research on parents of handicapped children, partnership sep-
aration, or women who were past the age for having their own chil-
dren, Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Fleeson, 2001; Tunali & Power, 1993;
Wrosch & Heckhausen, 1999, respectively). Although these studies
document that abandoning unattainable goals can be adaptive, it is
important to note that the work has focused on very specific, con-
crete goals. However, people doubtlessly also vary more generally in
their ability to adjust to unattainable goals.
We have argued for the existence of such individual differences in
people’s general goal-adjustment tendencies. We have further pro-
posed that such individual differences can predict a person’s quality
of life (Wrosch, Scheier, et al., 2003; Wrosch, Miller, et al., 2005).
Stated differently, some people might have an easier time disengag-
ing from unattainable goals and reengaging in alternative goals than
other people, regardless of the specific nature of the goals in ques-
tion. People who are better able to abandon unattainable goals and
to reengage in other meaningful activities should experience greater
subjective well-being and better physical health than people who
have a more difﬁcult time adjusting to their unattainable goals.
To start examining the inﬂuence of goal-adjustment tendencies on
quality of life, we developed a self-report instrument (Wrosch,
Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003), with 10 items that measure how people
usually react if they have to stop pursuing an important goal.
Four items measure the tendency to disengage from unattainable
goals (e.g., ‘‘It’s easy for me to reduce my effort towards the goal’’)
and six items measure the tendency to reengage in other new goals
(e.g., ‘‘I start working on other new goals’’). These scales have shown
predictive validity in a number of studies (Wrosch, Scheier, Miller,
et al., 2003; Wrosch et al., 2005). Notably, the effects of this variable
have been statistically independent of other coping constructs
(e.g., assimilation and accommodation; Brandtsta ¨ dter & Renner,
1990) and the personality traits of the Five-Factor Model
(Goldberg, 1992). This supports the premise that individual differ-
ences in goal adjustment are a meaningful and independent predictor
of quality of life.
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and goal reengagement on indicators of subjective well-being. One
study examined undergraduate students making the transition to
college (Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003, Study 1). As this tran-
sition involves multiple potential losses such as leaving friends and
family and an increased potential for failure experiences related to
academic pursuits, students often ﬁnd that some of their previously
valued goals have become unattainable. This study showed that a
capacity to withdraw effort and commitment from unattainable
goals related to lower levels of perceived stress and intrusive
thoughts and high levels of self-mastery. In addition, students who
were able to reengage in alternative goals reported lower levels
of perceived stress and intrusive thoughts as well as higher levels of
purpose in life and self-mastery. Further, there was an interaction
between goal disengagement and goal reengagement in predicting
indicators of subjective well-being. Among students who reported
difﬁculty disengaging from unattainable goals, those with a higher
capacity to reengage reported greater self-mastery and less perceived
stress than those less able to reengage. This pattern suggests that
goal reengagement can buffer the negative effects of inability to dis-
engage on subjective well-being.
Another study examined goal adjustment in an inescapable situ-
ation that could be expected to constrain important life goals
(Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003, Study 3). Parents of physical-
ly healthy children were compared with parents of children who had
been diagnosed with cancer. It was expected that the parents whose
children had been diagnosed with cancer might have to redeﬁne how
they evaluated success in life. In such a situation, goal disengagement
and goal reengagement may be very important since the parents are
forced to abandon certain goals and plans they had for themselves
and their families in order to direct resources to this immediate
challenge (e.g., giving up on career goals to spend more time with the
sick children). In support of our reasoning, goal disengagement and
goal reengagement tendencies were associated with fewer depressive
symptoms, particularly among parents of children with cancer
(Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003). In fact, among those parents
of children with cancer who were better able to adjust to unattain-
able goals, depression scores were almost as low as the scores of
parents of healthy children. These results support the idea that goal-
adjustment tendencies become particularly important in regulating
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established goal-directed activities.
Related research by the Leventhals and their colleagues (H. Duke,
Leventhal, Brownlee, & E. Leventhal, 2002) has also documented
the beneﬁcial effects of goal reengagement. They studied a group
of older adults, some of whom were having to abandon their physical
activities because of health-related problems. Persons who replaced
lost activities with new activities had higher positive affect one year
after the onset of their illness than those who did not replace the
activities. Interestingly, the tendency to replace lost activities was
facilitated by social support and dispositional optimism.
In another recent study, Bauer and Wrosch (2004) examined the
association between unattainable goals, goal adjustment tendencies,
and subjective well-being in a sample of adults. The participants
were asked to report all the goals that were important to them and
that became unattainable during the past 5 years. Unattainable goals
turned out to be a common experience. On average, participants re-
ported almost ﬁve goals that had become unattainable over the past
5 years. In addition, a higher frequency of unattainable goals exerted
a cumulative effect on subjective well-being: as the number of un-
attainable goals increased, individuals reported lower levels of
well-being. The study further found a significant interaction effect
between one’s capacity to disengage and the frequency of unattain-
able goals on indicators of well-being. More specifically, having
a high number of unattainable goals related to higher levels of
perceived stress, depressive symptoms, and negative affect, but only
among those individuals who experienced difﬁculty disengaging
from unattainable goals.
Another set of studies examined whether goal-adjustment tenden-
cies can also inﬂuence indicators of physical health. To start exam-
ining this hypothesis, in a heterogeneous and cross-sectional study of
adults, we related the number of reported physical health problems
(e.g., eczema, migraine headaches, constipation) to participants’ goal
disengagement and goal reengagement tendencies (Wrosch et al.,
2005, Study 1). Participants who were better able to let go of unat-
tainable goals reported fewer health problems than those who had
more difﬁculty disengaging from unattainable goals. Goal reengage-
ment, by contrast, did not relate to physical health problems. The
results were also consistent with the assumption, noted earlier, that
subjective well-being can mediate the link between goal adjustment
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levels of depressive symptoms and depressive symptoms predicted
participants’ physical health problems. Importantly, when the effect
of goal disengagement on physical health was controlled for depres-
sive symptomatology, goal disengagement no longer significantly
predicted participants’ physical health problems.
The associations between goal adjustment tendencies and physical
health were further examined in another sample of adults (Wrosch
et al., 2005, Study 2). This study included an assessment of partic-
ipants’ diurnal rhythm of cortisol secretion, a biological process that
is widely thought to be a ‘‘gateway’’ through which distress increases
vulnerability to medical illness. Persons facing severe and long-term
stressors exhibit a ﬂattened diurnal rhythm, characterized by low
morning output and/or the failure to reduce secretion as the day
progresses (e.g., Heim et al., 2000; Miller, Cohen, & Ritchey, 2002).
There is also evidence that ﬂattened diurnal cortisol rhythms are
prognostic of severe physical health outcomes (Heim et al., 2000;
Sephton, Sapolsky, Kraemer, & Spiegel, 2000; Smyth et al., 1997).
On the basis of these ﬁndings, we expected that participants who are
better able to let go of unattainable goals and reengage in alternative
goals would show a more normative (i.e., steeper) slope in diurnal
cortisol secretion than those who have more difﬁculties adjusting to
unattainable goals.
The results partly conﬁrmed our hypotheses. Adaptive goal-
disengagement tendencies were tied to a steeper of slope of
cortisol secretion over the day. As in the previously discussed study,
goal reengagement did not relate to indicators of physical health.
Further analyses found that differences in cortisol secretion as a
function of goal disengagement occurred in the day and evening
hours and not the morning hours. Our theoretical perspective
holds that individual differences in goal adjustment tendencies
should be particularly inﬂuential when people confront unattaina-
ble goals. Thus, it is not surprising that the inﬂuence of these
tendencies is not large during the early morning hours before
people start their normal activities. As the day progresses, how-
ever, and people try to do what they set out to do, they may en-
counter situations in which goal attainment is difﬁcult or impossible.
Thus, unattainable goals are more likely to emerge later in the day,
and differences in goal-disengagement tendencies become important
only then.
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physical health was further tested in a longitudinal design, following
a group of college students over the course of a semester (Wrosch
et al., 2005, Study 3). The study assessed goal adjustment tendencies
at the beginning of the term and predicted self-reported physical
health indicators (e.g., health symptoms, cold symptoms, sleep prob-
lems) at the end of the term. In addition, emotional well-being and
life satisfaction were measured at the beginning and the end of the
semester. Consistent with the previous studies, adaptive goal-disen-
gagement tendencies were associated with fewer health symptoms
and better sleep efﬁciency at the end of the semester. In addition,
there was evidence of a buffer effect of goal reengagement, in that
goal reengagement reduced the negative consequences of failure to
disengage on participants’ cold symptoms. Finally, the study pro-
vided further support for the mediating role of subjective well-being.
Adaptive goal-disengagement tendencies related to fewer declines in
emotional well-being across the course of the semester, and the ef-
fects of goal disengagement on changes in emotional well-being sta-
tistically explained the associations between goal disengagement and
indicators of physical health.
Together, these studies demonstrate that individual differences in
goal-disengagement and goal-reengagement tendencies can inﬂuence
a person’s quality of life. People who are better able to disengage
from unattainable goals and reengage in alternative goals report
higher levels of subjective well-being than people who have more
difﬁculty adjusting their unattainable goals. In addition, the studies
show that adaptive goal-disengagement tendencies are tied to high
levels of physical health. Further, goal-reengagement tendencies may
buffer the negative effects on physical health of failure in goal dis-
engagement. Finally, the studies suggest that the associations be-
tween goal-adjustment tendencies and physical health can be partly
explained by individual differences in subjective well-being.
PUTTING THINGS TOGETHER (A BIT): OPTIMISM AND GOAL
ADJUSTMENT
In conducting our research on goal disengagement processes,
we have not been terribly concerned about tying that work on
disengagement to our other line of work (reviewed previously) on
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about documenting that disengagement from goals that are per-
ceived as unattainable can be beneﬁcial. In spite of the relative in-
dependence of these two lines of work to date, we do have some
thoughts and a little data regarding the potential interplay between
optimism and goal-adjustment processes.
How might optimism and goal adjustment be linked? Although
we think that optimism and goal adjustment are separate facets of an
individual’s personality, it is reasonable to assume that there may be
associations between both constructs. For example, people who gen-
erally have an easier time adjusting to unattainable goals may be
more optimistic about their future because they know that they are
capable of managing difﬁculties and creating new purpose in life.
Alternatively, optimists may be better able than pessimists to adjust
unattainable goals because they expect good things to happen in the
future and may recognize more easily valuable alternatives that can
replace a goal that has become unattainable.
Although the evidence is somewhat scanty, the evidence that does
exist suggests that optimism may, in fact, be linked to certain aspects
of goal-adjustment processes. For example, research by Duke et al.
(2002) suggests that optimism may be implicated in the ability to
reengage in substitute goals. In a similar vein, Aspinwall and Richter
(1999) have shown that viable alternatives facilitate faster disen-
gagement from unsolvable tasks among optimists but not among
pessimists.
Our own data drawn from a sample of 115 college students sup-
port the ﬁndings by others by demonstrating a significant correlation
between optimism and goal reengagement but not between optimism
and goal disengagement (a ﬁnding that we replicated on an addi-
tional, independent sample of 488 college students). These ﬁndings
suggest that optimists have an easier time identifying and engaging in
new goals than pessimists. Subsequent analyses in the ﬁrst sample of
undergraduates also showed that optimism was associated higher
levels of subjective well-being, explaining 15% of the variance in
purpose of life. However, if taking goal-reengagement tendencies
into account, 60% of the effect of optimism on purpose in life (i.e.,
9% of the 15%) could be explained by individual differences in goal
reengagement tendencies. These results indicate that the beneﬁcial
effects of optimism on a person’s quality of life may, in part, be due
to the ability of optimists (compared to pessimists) to reengage in
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more research is being conducted, future work should focus on ex-
ploring dispositional optimism and the dual aspects of goal adjust-
ment along with the possible inﬂuences of these variables on
psychological and physical well-being.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
The purpose of this article was to explore implications of self-
regulatory models of human action for understanding how people
deal with threats to their health and well-being. We focused on how
specific aspects of a general behavioral self-regulation model—
variations in positive and negative expectations—are reﬂected in a
line of research on psychological and physical responses to several
different types of health problems and illness threats. We then ex-
plored a second line of work examining the importance of goal ad-
justment on physical and psychological well-being. From the
research reviewed, it is apparent that both dispositional optimism
and goal adjustment are important for general subjective well-being
and psychological adjustment. Positive expectations and goal ad-
justment play a role in determining physical health as well. Although
research tying these two areas together has only recently begun, the
available data suggests that optimists tend to reengage in new goals
when other valued goals have become unattainable. Future investi-
gations should further examine the relations between optimism and
goal adjustment, as well as how these processes inﬂuence mental and
physical health. Such research will enrich our understanding of the
processes involved in adaptive self-regulation.
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